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Abstract An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale
through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the
fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that
the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay,
Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.
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1 Introduction
An auction is typically viewed as a trade mechanism which involves two sides: sellers
and buyers. However, the presence of a third side, an independent mediator, may have
essential influence on the strategic behavior of the traders. This is the case in Internet
auctions where the role of mediators is played by such giant commercial institutions
as eBay, Yahoo, Amazon, and others. In contrast to the existing literature on “optimal
auctions,” that is, auction mechanisms which maximize a seller’s revenue, we are
looking for the optimal strategy for a mediator (an “auction house”). This question
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has not only theoretic interest, but also practical relevance, as, for example, the leader
of the Internet auction industry, eBay Inc., reported net revenue of $6 billion in 2006.1
Usually an auction house requires a seller to pay a listing fee, a price of initiating the
auction, and, if the object is sold, a closing fee, a certain fraction of the final price. Our
central question is: What are the fees that maximize the profit of the auction house?
Generally, in a two-part tariff scheme both tariffs are positive in equilibrium. In this
paper, however, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero.
We consider a Vickrey auction with reserve price, an analogue to the proxi-bidding
mechanism used by Internet auctions. We assume that if the seller’s reserve price is
not met, he has a possibility to re-auction the object. This option is available to agents
in real life and has essential impact on their strategic behavior (see, e.g., Milgrom
1987; Haile 2000, 2003). In every (re)auction the seller faces a different set of bidders
drawn from a large population. The auction house requires the seller to pay a listing
fee (which can be negative), and, if the object is sold, a closing fee (a percentage of
the closing price). The fees are selected by the auction house before trade and remain
constant thereafter.
We characterize the optimal strategy (the choice of the fees) for the auction house. In
particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero, that is, for the auction house it is
not optimal to demand an up-front payment from the seller, nor to offer him a subsidy.
Our results provide formal grounds for the current policy of large Internet auction
houses. For example, eBay charges the listing fee of $0.20 to $4.80 (for reserve price
above $500)2; Amazon charges the listing fee of $0.10, which is waived for qualified
sellers3; QXL.com charges the listing fee of £0.05–0.40 (for reserve price above £30);
Bidville.com and uBid.com charge no listing fees.
This paper is one of the first in the auction literature which raises the question of
profit maximization for an auction mediator. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) are
the first who analyze a bilateral trade mediated by a “broker” in a static environment
without possibility of resale. They describe a mechanism which maximizes the broker’s
payoff subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for the
traders. A variety of work extends Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to the study of
two-sided markets (a mass interaction of multiple sellers and buyers, typically with
network externalities) mediated by “platforms”, starting with the double auction of
Wilson (1985) and including (but not limited to) Rochet and Tirole (2003), Hagiu
(2004), Reisinger (2004), and Armstrong (2006). Instead, the focus of this paper is
the mediated auction–kind interaction of one seller and many buyers.
A large set of related literature deals with unmeditated auctions with the pos-
sibility of after-auction resale. Such a possibility affects nontrivially the bidding
behavior, since bidders’ valuations partially depend on expectations of a resale out-
come. There are two approaches: one-time after-auction resale, where the object
owner can sell the object after the auction on a secondary market (Milgrom 1987;
Bikhchandani and Huang 1989; Gupta and Lebrun 1999; Haile 1999, 2000, 2003;
1 See http://investor.ebay.com/releases.cfm.
2 Basic fees can be found on http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html.
3 Amazon’s fees can be found on http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html.
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Krishna 2002, Sect. 4.4; Calzolari and Pavan 2003; Garratt and Tröger 2006), and
re-auctioning, where the object may be re-auctioned multiple times (McAfee and
Vincent 1997; Horstmann and LaCasse 1997; Zheng 2002).
In this paper we allow re-auctioning, but the important difference from the literature
above is that the seller deals with a new set of bidders in every (re)auction.4 It entails
that the seller faces ex-ante the same problem in every auction, hence, if he is willing
to auction the object once, he will re-auction it until the object is sold. This provides
some intuition why zero listing fee is optimal: By demanding only a closing fee, the
auction house takes the same part in the (expected) current-period payoff and in the
continuation payoff of the seller, thus making the interests of the seller and the auction
house fully aligned.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Sect. 2. The first step
of the analysis, the optimal behavior of the seller, is made in Sect. 3. Our main results
concerning the optimal policy of the auction house are stated in Sect. 4. The model
assumptions and possible variations are discussed in Sect. 5.
2 The model
Consider a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of bidders, N , and
an auction house (auction mediator). All bidders in population N have private values
for the object, i.i.d. random variables with a distribution function F on interval [0, 1].
The seller also has a private value independent of bidders’ values, with distribution
Fs on [0, 1]. Every agent knows her own private value. We assume that functions F
and Fs are differentiable and have positive density on (0, 1). In addition, we assume
that F and Fs satisfy Myerson’s (1981) regularity conditions, namely, z − 1−F(z)f (z) and
z + Fs (z)fs (z) are strictly increasing on (0, 1), where f and fs denote the corresponding
density functions.
The auction house, the seller, and the bidders are engaged in the following game.
In period 0, the auction house announces fees for all subsequent auctions: a listing
fee, c ∈ R, and a closing fee, a fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of the closing price (if the object
is sold). A negative listing fee means that the auction house pays to the seller amount
|c| each time the object is displayed on the auction. In every period t = 1, 2, . . . the
following two-stage game is played:
Stage 1. The seller decides whether to consume the object or to offer it for sale via
auction. If the object is consumed, the game ends. Otherwise, the second stage comes.
Stage 2. The auction house runs a Vickrey auction. The set of k bidders is randomly
drawn from the population N . The seller announces a reserve price, then the bidders
make their bids simultaneously. If there is a winner in the auction, she transfers to the
seller a payment equal to the second highest bid (or the reserve price) and the game
ends. Otherwise, if all bids are below the reserve price, the game proceeds to the next
4 An exception is Haile (1999) who assumes that new buyers arrive to a resale market. However, he considers
the model of one-time resale (not re-auction), and, besides, he assumes that the bidders participating in the
first period remain in the secondary market.
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period. Regardless of the auction outcome, the seller pays to the auction house the
listing fee c, and in addition, if the object is sold, the closing fee µ.
We assume that all agents are risk neutral, the seller does not derive any utility from
the object until it is sold or consumed, δ is a discount factor for all agents and the
auction house, parameters k, δ, and the distribution functions F and Fs are common
knowledge.
In the next section we find the optimal seller’s reserve price, r∗c,µ, for any auction
house fee scheme (c, µ). Then, in Sect. 4 we find the optimal auction house fee scheme.
3 Seller: optimal reserve price
Fix the auction fee scheme (c, µ) and period t . To simplify notations, we omit the
time period index whenever it does not result in a confusion.
For every reserve price r ∈ [0, 1] denote by q(r) the probability that the object is
sold on the auction, and by P(r) the expected closing price, i.e., the expected payment
of the winning bidder conditional on the event that the object is sold.
Denote by v(r, v∗c,µ) the expected seller’s revenue from the auction, where r ∈ [0, 1]
is the selected reserve price and v∗c,µ ∈ R is the highest expected revenue that the seller
can attain from the next-period auction. Thus,
v(r, v∗c,µ) ≡ q(r)P(r)(1 − µ) + (1 − q(r))δv∗c,µ − c. (1)
Since in every period the seller faces ex-ante the same bidding environment, we con-
sider only Markov strategies of the seller, i.e., strategies which depend on the seller’s
private value of the object and are independent of the decision time. The following
equation must hold,
v∗c,µ = max0≤r≤1 v(r, v
∗
c,µ).
We can now describe the optimal (behavior) strategy of the seller. Let vs be the seller’s
private value of the object. Then
(a) The seller consumes the object immediately (in period 1) if his private value is
at least as high as the expected gain from the auction (net of the auction fees)
vs ≥ v∗c,µ, (2)
otherwise he auctions the object in every subsequent period, until it is sold. In
particular, it means that if µ = 1, then v∗c,µ < 0 ≤ vs , or the seller consumers
the object.
(b) If the seller auctions the object, µ < 1, then in every period the reserve price is
r∗c,µ ∈ argmax
0≤r≤1
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Note that the seller’s optimal reserve price r∗c,µ and expected revenue v∗c,µ do not
depend on his private value vs (as long as vs < v∗c,µ).
The following lemma helps to prove the main result of this section.
Lemma 1 For every z ∈ R function q(r)(P(r) − z) is maximized w.r.t. r on [0, 1] at
a unique point.
Proof Consider a Vickrey auction with k bidders. By a straightforward computation
(see, e.g., Krishna 2002, Sects. 2.2 and 2.4), we obtain










where G is the distribution function of the second highest bidder’s value
G(x) = Fk(x) + k Fk−1(x)(1 − F(x)).
Then, for any constant z, integrating
∫ 1
r
xdG (x) by parts yields
q(r) (P(r) − z) = 1 − z + Fk(r)(z − r) −
1∫
r
G (x) dx .
Taking the derivative w.r.t. r , we obtain
∂
∂r
[q(r) (P(r) − z)] = −k Fk−1(r) f (r)
[
r − 1 − F(r)f (r) − z
]
.
Let r∗ ∈ argmaxr∈[0,1] q(r)(P(r) − z). Since k Fk−1(r) f (r) > 0 for all r ∈ (0, 1]
and by Myerson’s regularity condition r − 1−F(r)f (r) strictly increases, it follows that
r∗ = 0 if r − 1−F(r)f (r) > z for all r ∈ (0, 1], r∗ = 1 if r − 1−F(r)f (r) < z for all r ∈ [0, 1),
otherwise r∗ is the unique value which satisfies r∗ − 1−F(r∗)f (r∗) = z. unionsq
We can now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 For every pair of auction fees (c, µ) ∈ R×[0, 1] there exists a unique
pair (r∗c,µ, v∗c,µ) ∈ [0, 1] × R which satisfies
v∗c,µ = v(r∗c,µ, v∗c,µ) = max0≤r≤1 v(r, v
∗
c,µ). (4)
Proof If the seller auctions the object, µ < 1, then (1) can be rewritten as follows
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After maximizing (5) w.r.t. r on [0, 1], moving δv∗ to the left-hand side and dividing
both sides by (1 − δ), we obtain
v∗c,µ = −
c
1 − δ +
1 − µ










Note that if v∗c,µ = − c1−δ , then the right-hand side is greater than the left-hand side;
if v∗c,µ = 1−µδ , then the right-hand side is less than the left-hand side. Since the left-
hand side strictly increases and the right-hand side weakly decreases in v∗c,µ ∈ R,
there exists a unique solution of the Eq. (6).
Applying Lemma 1 with z = δv∗c,µ1−µ yields a unique value of r∗c,µ. unionsq
This proposition shows that the seller auctions the object and sets the reserve price
r∗ regardless of his use value of vs , as long as vs < v∗c,µ. Thus, the equilibrium
strategy of the seller is pooling: it is not strictly monotonic with respect to his use
value. The effective reserve value of the seller is not his private use value, instead, it
is the continuation value, the expected payoff from the future auctions.
Note that the number of bidders drawn in every period does not have to be determin-
istic; it suffices to have a random number of bidders drawn from the same distribution
in every period. Indeed, since the seller selects a reserve price before he knows how
many bidders participate in the auction, his decision depends only on the distribution
of the number of bidders.
4 Auction house: optimal fees
Fix (r∗c,µ, v∗c,µ), and suppose that vs < v∗c,µ. Denote by U (r∗c,µ) the expected gross
revenue of the seller (before the fees are deducted). Since r∗c,µ is constant over time,
we can write U (r∗c,µ) as follows,
U (r∗c,µ) = q(r∗c,µ)P(r∗c,µ) + (1 − q(r∗c,µ))δU (r∗c,µ). (7)
The (unconditional) expected revenue of the auction house can be written as the
product of the expected revenue of the auction house conditional on vs < v∗c,µ and the
probability that vs < v∗c,µ ,
(
U (r∗c,µ) − v∗c,µ
)
Fs(v∗c,µ). (8)
First, we find a pair (r∗c,µ, v∗c,µ) which maximizes (8). Then we derive the optimal
scheme (c, µ) which yields the desired (r∗c,µ, v∗c,µ).




q(r)P(r) + (1 − q(r))δU¯] . (9)
Note that U¯ is independent of (c, µ).
We can now state the main result of the paper.
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The unique pair of optimal fees (c, µ) is given by c = 0 and µ = U¯−v∗U¯ , where v∗ is
the maximizer of (10).
Proof Let (r∗, v∗) be a pair which maximizes (8). First, we show that such a pair
is unique. Notice that the only part of (8) which depends on r∗ is U (r∗), hence,
r∗ ∈ argmax0≤r≤1 U (r) subject to (7) with replacement of r∗c,µ by r∗. By (9) this




U¯ − v) Fs(v).










Since fs(v) > 0 and, by Myerson’s regularity condition, v+ Fs (v)fs (v) is strictly increasing,
there exists a unique maximizer of W (v), v∗. Next, rewriting (9) as
(1 − δ)U¯ = max
0≤r≤1 q(r)(P(r) − δU¯ )






P(r) − δU¯)] . (11)
We now derive the optimal scheme (c, µ) which yields (r∗c,µ, v∗c,µ) = (r∗, v∗). The











Combining (11) and (12) yields that r∗c,µ = r∗ if and only if




Multiplying both sides of (9) by 1 − µ, we obtain
(1 − µ)U¯ = max
0≤r≤1
[
q(r)P(r)(1 − µ) + (1 − q(r))δU¯ (1 − µ)] .
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q(r)P(r)(1 − µ) + (1 − q(r))δv∗c,µ
] − c.
Hence, v∗c,µ = v∗ if and only if c = 0. unionsq
Theorem 1 states that the optimal fee scheme for the auction house is a positive
percentage of the seller’s revenue and zero listing fee. The percentage is selected in
such a way that makes interests of the seller and the auction house fully aligned. By
demanding a percentage of the seller’s payoff, the auction house takes the same part
in the (expected) current-period payoff and in the continuation payoff. It aligns the
seller’s and the auction house’s interests not only in the current period, but also in the
future.
Note that in the optimal fee scheme, zero listing fee means that the seller neither
collects an up-front payment from the seller, nor subsidizes the seller.
5 Discussion
We discuss our basic assumptions in this section.
1. No re-auction possibility for a winning bidder.
In our model a winning bidder is not allowed to re-auction the object. Adding this
possibility for a winning bidder would not make any effect on the optimal reserve
price for the (initial) seller and on the optimal auction fees.
2. No outside trade.
It is crucial for our analysis that all trade happens via the auction. Namely, the seller
does not use the auction as a free advertising, for instance, by setting the reserve price
high enough to make sure that no one buys the object. The typical case when this
assumption is violated is the Internet auctions for used cars.
3. Auction house monopoly.
We assume that the auction house is a monopolist. This assumption can be consid-
ered as an approximation of reality, since large auction houses tend to gain substantial
monopolistic power. For example, a seller’s rating based on positive feedback over
completed sales motivates the seller to stay with the same auction house. The size of
an auction house also contributes to its monopolistic power: bigger auction houses are
more attractive to traders.
4. Listing fee and closing fee.
The use of listing and closing fees is the most popular way for the auction houses to
obtain payments. In fact, we are not aware of any other payment mechanism which is
used in Internet auctions. Our analysis demonstrates that the actual listing and closing
fees that major Internet auction houses apply indeed maximize their revenue.
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